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When counting-like abilities were first described in the honeybee in the
mid-1990s, many scholars were sceptical, but such capacities have since
been confirmed in a number of paradigms and also in other insect species.
Counter to the intuitive notion that counting is a cognitively advanced
ability, neural network analyses indicate that it can be mediated by very
small neural circuits, and we should therefore perhaps not be surprised that
insects and other small-brained animals such as some small fish exhibit such
abilities. One outstanding question is how bees actually acquire numerical
information. For perception of small numerosities, working-memory capacity
may limit the number of items that can be enumerated, but within these limits,
numerosity can be evaluated accurately and (at least in primates) in parallel.
However, presentation of visual stimuli in parallel does not automatically
ensure parallel processing. Recent work on the question of whether bees can
see ‘at a glance’ indicates that bees must acquire spatial detail by sequential
scanning rather than parallel processing. We explore how this might be
tested for a numerosity task in bees and other animals.
This article is part of a discussion meeting issue ‘The origins of numerical
abilities’.1. Introduction
‘Two tigers were seen going into the cave. Only one came out. Is the cave safe?’
This stark example [1] illustrates the survival value of a non-verbal, non-symbolic
sense of number. Predator vigilance, foraging and navigation are obvious
contexts in which ability to assess quantity would seem adaptive. The more com-
plex the interaction with the environment, the more likely it is that an organism
will benefit from estimating and keeping track of quantitative variables, including
time and magnitude (countable and non-countable). The basic operations of
cognition track both objects and events in order to make appropriate decisions.
Arguably, however, there has been a tradition to view cognitive processes as dis-
tinct from ‘simple’ associative learning. Undeniably, humans engage in higher
cognitive processes during mathematical reasoning or when thinking about tem-
poral relations and causes. Yet as long ago as 1946, arguing from the results of a
series of influential experiments, Michotte proposed that causality is a basic attri-
bute of visual perception [2]. More recently, the same has been argued for
perception of numerosity [3]. Nevertheless, there remains a tendency to fetishize
numerical cognition, because of its association with the most advanced human
intellectual achievements. Consequently, demonstrating any form of numerical
competence in non-human animals requires tortuous controls, to rule out dis-
crimination on the basis of some continuous magnitude rather than numerosity
per se. These controls are indeed required, but carry the implicit assumption
that quantity discrimination is inherently more complex for countable rather
than non-countable quantities, perhaps reflecting a higher cortical function.
Figure 1. Landmark counting by honeybees in an open field. Bees were orig-
inally trained to fly from a hive (out of view to the left) to a feeder located at
a distance of 262.5 m, between the third and fourth of a series of yellow
tetrahedral tents, spaced 75 m apart. In subsequent tests, spacing between
the tents was systematically varied and two feeders were offered; one at or
close to the distance from the hive learned during training, and a second
spaced between the second and third tents, and consequently, at an altered
flight distance from the hive [15]. The question was, would the bees be more
likely to find the feeder at the trained distance, or would they find it by the
number of landmarks passed during training flights? See text for details.
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strated in vertebrates that lack the mammalian neocortex (see
Agrillo & Bisazza [4]). In fact, it seems highly unlikely that
the architectural plan of the vertebrate brain is necessary for
basic numerical cognition; cuttlefish, for example, have
recently been claimed to discriminate prey items on the basis
of numerosity [5]
Contrary to the notion that numerical cognition is a com-
plex, higher cortical function, theoretical studies indicate that
numerical discrimination requires no more than a classifier
and a threshold mechanism [6], which can be implemented
by known neural circuits ([7]; see also Rose [8]). The extent to
which such mechanisms can explain numerical cognition
remains to be determined, but the point is that we should not
necessarily be surprised that cognitive animals can keep track
of entities in their environment, including, up to a point,
number of entities. The question of how they do this is of central
neurobiological interest, which involvesmore than demonstrat-
ing proto-human counting abilities in animals. Here, we review
the literature on counting-like abilities in insects. We argue that
there might be relatively little mileage in discovering more
animal species with numerosity capacities, since the ability in
itself might be relatively trivial. A promising avenue of future
research might be to explore how animals such as insects
solve numerosity tasks, which requires a detailed inspection
of their choice behaviour rather than just tallying correct
versus incorrect choices in discrimination tests. Such an explora-
tionmight reveal that insects (and perhaps other animals) count
by fundamentally different strategies, underpinned by different
mechanisms, compared to humans. Specifically, the need to
acquire visual-spatial information by sequential scanning,
rather than parallel processing of entire visual scenes, might
require insects to inspect items one after another, and limit
their ability to subitize (seeing numbers at a glance).
2. Numerical cognition in invertebrates
Compared to comparative studies in vertebrates, rather less is
known about numerical cognition in invertebrates. However,
it is clear that both countable and non-countable quantitative
information may be used in guiding behaviour. Ants, for
example, measure distance by integrating step count [9,10]
but can also learn to use size of visual stimuli as direction
cues [11]. Bees can perform visual discrimination on the basis
of both size [12] and numerical quantity [13].
An early exploration of numerosity in bees was performed
by Leppik [14]. This is a useful case study in the adaptive utility
of a number sense, aswell as the pitfalls that need to be avoided
when studyingwhether subjects respond to number rather than
other cues that would allow the same outcome. Leppik noted
that radially symmetric flowers often have relatively low num-
bers of petals (e.g. 3,5,6 or 7) and suggested that bees might
remember the species-specific number of petals to distinguish
rewarding from unrewarding species. To support his idea, he
removed defined numbers of petals from some flower species
andmonitored bee visitation rates before and after themanipu-
lation. He found that bee visits were substantially reduced
when petal numbers were lowered, and concluded that bees
must have been sensitive to petal number. This is possible,
but without control tests, it is equally plausible that bees
might instead have responded to reduced contour length,
area subtended, or they might have been deterred by odour
cues emanating from damaged flowers.Chittka & Geiger [15] provided the first evidence that
numerical cues may be used in honeybee navigation. Bees
were trained to forage from a feeder in an open field located
at a fixed distance from the hive (262.5 m). A series of yellow,
tetrahedral tents of 3.5 m height was set up, to act as land-
marks along the flight path (figure 1). The feeder was
located midway between the third and the fourth landmarks.
Following training, bees were tested in a control experiment,
where a second feeder was placed closer to the hive, between
the second and third tents. In this situation all but one of the
bees flew the original distance to the trained feeder. Next, the
relationship between flight distance and number of land-
marks passed was systematically probed by varying the
number of landmarks and the distance between them. For
example, in one test the spacing between tents was decreased
so that the trained feeder was now located between the fourth
and the fifth tents. A second feeder was located between the
third and the fourth tents, at a shorter distance from the hive.
Would the bees choose to fly the original distance, past four
landmarks instead of three, or would they choose the feeder
located at a shorter distance but past the previously experi-
enced number of landmarks? Most of the bees (76%) landed
at the feeder located closest to the trained feeder, but a quarter
landed at the test feeder between the third and fourth tents. In
further tests where the number of landmarkswere increased or
decreased, the bees’ group behaviour suggested a compromise
between an estimate of the learned distance and landmark cues
in test feeder choice. However, in all cases, a significant min-
ority (8–26%) of bees based their landing decisions on the
number of landmarks (i.e. choosing a feeder located between
the third and fourth tents regardless of distance). Since no
transfer to other types of countable objects was explored,
Chittka & Geiger argued that a ‘proto-counting’ strategy was
the likeliest explanation for the behaviour of this group of bees.
At the time of the discovery in the mid-1990s, this result
seemed rather startling. Although the associative learning
abilities of bees were not in doubt, counting was viewed as
a ‘higher’ cognitive function, beyond simple association
([16], but see [17,18]). However, the Chittka & Geiger result
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Figure 2. Landmark counting in a laboratory flight tunnel. (a) Individual
bees were trained to receive a reward after they had flown past a specified
number of landmarks. During training, the landmarks were strips of evenly
spaced yellow paper (upper). Spacing interval was randomly varied every
5 min, to ensure the bees could not learn the reward location by measuring
flight distance. Different experimental groups were tested on the same land-
marks as in training; in tunnels where the stripes were replaced by yellow
disks, presenting a smaller cumulative yellow surface; or in tunnels where
landmarks were arranged as baffles, so that only one could be seen at a
time. (b) Results of an experiment where bees were trained on landmark
3, then tested with landmarks spaced regularly every 40 cm (upper panel)
or irregularly spaced (lower panel). Modified from Dacke & Srinivasan [21],
with permission.
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org
Phil.Trans.R.Soc.B
373:20160513
3
 on January 4, 2018http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from has since been replicated by multiple teams, including a field
study, where harmonic radar was used to track the choices of
individual bees [19]; again, the majority of bees based
decisions on distance flown, but the search behaviour of a
clear minority was centred on the landmark number that
had previously cued feeder location. This suggests that the
honeybee’s odometer (distance estimator) dominates naviga-
tion learning, which is perhaps not surprising, since it is
distance that is communicated to nest-mate foragers via the
waggle dance [20]. However, analysis of the behaviour of
individual bees indicates that sequential, countable cues are
also learned. This point has been confirmed and extended
in a controlled laboratory setting [21], which allowed cue
manipulation to demonstrate unambiguously that the bees
were learning numerosity per se. The investigators were also
able to determine the upper limit for bees’ numerical rep-
resentation in this task, which appears to be a maximum of
four landmarks. Importantly, it was also shown that the
bees could abstract numerosity from the particular perceptual
details of the stimuli, as if learning a rule ‘search after three’
irrespective of the particular cue used (figure 2). This ability
to abstract numerosity in transfer tests is regarded as a key
component of numerical cognition [22].
The ability of bees to generalize visual stimuli purely on
the basis of number was probed further in a carefully con-
trolled study by Gross et al. [23]. Bees were trained on a
delayed-match-to-sample task where the matching required
learning the number of elements in the visual stimuli. Initially
bees were trained on a sample of either two or three dots and
required to choose the matching sample from the appropriate
arm of a y-maze (figure 3). This task was readily learned.
Extensive control experiments varied the orientation, colour
and shape of the individual elements of the stimuli to mini-
mize the possibility that the bees could solve the task on
the basis of anything other than abstracted numerical quan-
tity. Importantly, the bees were able to generalize the
match-to-sample rule to novel stimulus items, but the limit
for this was between three and four.
In an interesting exploration of counting in an ecological
context, the behaviour of bumblebees foraging from flowers
with five nectaries was analysed [24]. Optimal behaviour
here would be to avoid revisiting depleted nectaries, which
implies keeping a tally of number visited, and not visiting
more than five. In the field, the probability of departing
from a flower increased sharply with number of nectaries
probed up to the number of five, and this number of nectary
probes was by far the most common. A sixth nectary probe
(i.e. a revisit) was very rare. The authors were able to exclude
alternative explanations, for example that bumblebees used
scent marks left by their tarsal glands to avoid nectaries
already visited. Solitary bees (Eucera sp.) also mastered this
task, but with less precision and in a manner such that the
authors could not rule out alternative explanations, such as
using scent marks or simply abandoning flowers when bees
encountered empty nectaries [25].
In a controlled laboratory experiment, it proved rather diffi-
cult to train bumblebees to artificial flowers that would reward
only two probes; over 1000 trials were required before the bees
learned to depart after two to three probes [24]. The authors
note that the nectaries are only visible to the bees one at a
time, and largely indistinguishable based on visual features.
Consequently, a form of motor sequence learning may have
been required to keep tally of number of probes.Recent evidence suggests that orb-web spiders maintain a
tally of prey items in ‘larders’, which they accumulate on
their webs [26]. Removal of the prey larder elicits searching
behaviour, the duration of which is proportional to larder
size, suggesting spiders remember the size of the larder
they have accumulated. Rodrı´guez et al. [26] attempted to
assess the relative roles of prey count as against total quan-
tity. Search time increased both with prey mass and
number (up to four prey items), but the rise was steeper for
increasing prey count compared to equivalent increases in
flight tunnel to
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Figure 3. Summary of bees’ choice behaviour in the experiments of Gross
et al. [23]. Following training on either two or three stimuli, bees were
tested in discrimination or transfer tests with a sample of numerosity
either two or (illustrated here) three (in the actual experiments the correct
arm of the Y-maze was randomized). (a) Exact pattern match. (b) Pattern
matching by numerosity only. Size, configuration, colour were varied in exten-
sive series of transfer tests to rule out non-numerical cues. (c) Bees were able
to match to sample when distractor contained novel numerosity ( four), but
performance was not significantly above chance when the sample contained
the novel numerosity (d ). Bees were also unable to discriminate between
stimuli containing four and six items (not shown).
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track of prey numerosity.3. Systems for number representation
Human numerosity discrimination may involve counting, esti-
mation or subitizing [27]. Counting, in the strictest sense of the
word, requires a symbolic number system (numerals), devel-
oped in some human cultures [28]. In animals, counting-like
abilities are said to exist where a response to the number of
stimuli in a set can be abstracted to qualitatively differentsets of stimuli [29,30]. Subitizing is the ability to perceive the
number of items in a small set, which is accurate up to about
four items (and in humans is accomplished ‘at a glance’). Esti-
mation is the ability to judge approximately the numerosity of
larger sets without counting. In comparative studies too a dis-
tinction is commonly made between numerosities consisting of
four items or fewer (the subitizing range), and larger numbers
[22,31]. The large number system (estimation) is analogue and
approximate and the error around the test number scales with
its magnitude, according to Weber’s law. This entails that the
accuracy with which two numerosities can be discriminated
is limited by the ratio of their size difference rather than the
absolute size difference. The small number system, by contrast,
is exact, ratio independent and has an abrupt limit of three or
four items [31]. It is possible that these two number systems are
a basic feature of vertebrate cognitive architecture since it has
been demonstrated in both guppies and college students [32].
It may be significant that an upper limit of around four
items has also emerged from the recent studies on bees
reviewed above [21,23]. The existence of a ratio-dependent
system for approximate comparison of larger numerosities
has not been found in invertebrates (at least for visually
based decisions). However, male mealworms were shown to
keep track of number of females in olfactory bouquets from
up to four females; there was a ratio-dependence greater than
1 : 2 in this range; males could discriminate one from three or
four, but not one from two, or two from four [33]. It should
also be noted that non-countable quantity estimation has
been shown to be subject to Weber’s law in invertebrates.
The visual odometer of the honeybee, for example, estimates
distance by integration of retinal flow of visual texture [34],
and in experiments where bees are trained to fly a set distance,
the error is proportional to the trained distance [35].
The symbolic number system made possible by human
language eases the constraint imposed by Weber’s law. Given
number symbols (words), arbitrarily large numbers can be dis-
criminated with equal accuracy. For example, discriminating
109 from 110 would be impractical (though not formally
impossible) for an analogue approximate number system
thatwas not alsomapped to a symbolic number system.Never-
theless, human reaction times in discriminating numerals such
as 109 from 110 would be expected to be longer than discrimi-
nating 110 from190; such a ratio-dependent effect is a signature
of an analogue system [36]. However, with an analogue
magnitude systemmapped to a symbolic number system, arbi-
trarily large numbers can be discriminated with the same
accuracy (albeit with a speed–accuracy trade-off) as small
ones, and indeed without the need for an increased working-
memory capacity. All that is needed is to keep track of the
last number counted, and a spatial counting strategy to avoid
counting items twice (e.g. left to right plus top to bottom in a
vertical 2D display). Without word labels, counting to higher
numbers is inherently much more challenging. It has in fact
been suggested that the development of uniquely human cog-
nition involved an evolutionary trade-off between working
memory and symbolic representation capacities [37].4. What accounts for the upper limit of around
four countable items in many species?
If it is indeed the case that a small number system is based on
object individuation—the representation of distinct objects—
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and perception [31] and subject to the capacity limit of work-
ing memory, classically assumed to be in the range 4–7 [38],
but more recently argued to be centred around four items
[39]. What accounts for this limit?
One possibility is that the limit is inherent to the dynamics
of neural circuitry [40]. An influential, if unproven, hypothesis
is that objects are represented by neural assemblies, which bind
local sensory features into coherent percepts [41–43]. For
example, edges at disparate spatial locations could be part of
one large or two smaller objects. The same applies to other
visual attributes: a yellow star, blue triangle and green circle
are three items, which have to be individuated incorporating
differences in colour, shape, size, etc. Spike synchrony has
been proposed as a mechanism to do this. To bind ‘green’
with ‘triangle’ requires the spiking signals for green (but
not those for blue) to be synchronized with those for the tri-
angle. A large body of work suggests that this synchrony is
achieved by means of neuronal oscillations with a frequency
of about 40 Hz; neurons belonging to the same assembly
would oscillate in phase and thus have a strong tendency for
synchronous spiking. In our simplistic example, neurons sig-
nalling blue would not fire in phase with those signalling
triangle and would thus be considered to belong to a different
assembly. Note that the individual sensory signals are inde-
pendent of these phase relationships. The spike count over an
integration window can be similar, with or without synchroni-
zation to other neurons. Synchrony mediated by oscillation
functions as a carrier signal to assign neurons to assemblies,
rather than as a code for any particular perceptual attribute.
Numerosity, according to this scheme, is not coded by any par-
ticular feature that defines a neural assembly (such as phase
with respect to oscillation cycle); rather, numerosity is inherent
in the number of assemblies that are active.
A clear implication of this is that there will be a trade-off
between the number of neuronal assemblies to be maintained
simultaneously, and the stability of each representation. This
will be based on the fundamental temporal dynamics of the
neuronal membrane. A larger number of simultaneously
active assemblies means smaller phase differences between
each assembly. The accuracy with which neuronal spiking can
be timed to phase will therefore impose a maximum on the
number of assemblies that can simultaneously be maintained
before the assignment of a particular spike to a particular
assembly becomes ambiguous (and therefore, it may no
longer be possible to distinguish blue triangle and green circle
form green triangle and blue circle). Simulation studies sug-
gest this limit is in the range of 4–7 [40]. In principle, any
coding scheme based on dynamical neural assemblies will be
constrained by the temporal resolution of individual neurons.
The precise role of synchronous oscillations in defining
functional neural assemblies is a matter of continuing debate,
although a functional role is reasonably well established in
the olfactory system of both mammals and insects. Oscillations
in the 10–30 Hz range have been recorded from locusts [44],
honeybees [45] and Drosophila [46] and have been shown
to be necessary for fine odour discrimination in locusts
and honeybees.
The known temporal dynamics of insect and mammalian
brains operate over similar time scales, in contrast to the
known dissimilarities in brain architecture, and orders-of-
magnitude differences in neuronal number. This implies that
the difference between the large brains of primates and thesmall brains of bees might be in representational richness,
not in the number of separate representations that can be
simultaneously maintained. Brain size will have an impact
on the size of neuronal assemblies (more neurons available
for each assembly) and therefore the amount of information
that can be processed in parallel, but not on the number of
neuronal assemblies that can simultaneously be maintained
(which would be constrained by similar temporal dynamics
in large and small brains). Bigger brains allow more parallel
processing [47,48].
5. Numerical cognition in small brains
Is it surprising that numerical cognition in animals is indepen-
dent of the crowning glory of mammalian neocortex? Probably
not [49,50]. An influential model [6] suggested a rather simple
mechanism for extraction of numerosity from magnitude.
Indeed, this model consisted of three modules containing a
total of 530 independently firing units (neural clusters in
their case, but for functional purposes they might be regarded
as individual neurons) and with this limited tool kit, the net-
work could extract approximate numerosity from parallel
visual displays (up to five items in this case, although in prin-
ciple this is not limited, but depends on the size of the input
array). The variance in the numerosity estimate in this model
increased in proportion to the numerosity itself (Weber’s
law); in keepingwith this themodel could reliably discriminate
two from three, but was only slightly above chance for three
from four [6], a performance similar to human infants [51].
Nevertheless, this suggests that even if an insect evolved a
dedicated small number discrimination module de novo, with-
out capitalizing on abilities emerging from existing circuits
[52], the added 500 neurons would hardly be detectable in
terms of gross neuroanatomy even in a brain as small asDroso-
phila’s. More recently, a deep learning algorithm, containing
just two hidden layers with 35 neurons, was able to model suc-
cessfully key results from human and non-human animal
studies [53]. Thismirrors other studies in computational neuro-
science which show that the single task that requires a big
brain, in terms of the computational capacities required,
remains to be discovered [49]. Clearly, large brains are not a
prerequisite for numerical cognition.
A fundamental misunderstanding in cognitive neuro-
science may be that in order to discriminate by a certain
visual attribute, one needs to have a specialized neuron type
for it (the neuron doctrine). However, so long as a certain
visual feature (be it number, area, edge orientation, symmetry,
texture, etc.) reliably activates an identifiable ensemble code of
multiple neurons, that feature can be encoded—and thus,
learned about. It may indeed be the case that neurons can be
shown to respond to approximate numerosity [54], among
other things, but this does not mean that numerical cognition,
in the first instance depends on specification of numerosity-
detecting neurons. Consider, for example, that the optic lobes
of insects (lamina, medulla, lobula (and lobula plate, in some
insects)) contain perhaps 200 neuronal classes, and together
comprise approximately half of the brain [55,56]. Although
many optic lobe neurons have historically been described as
e.g. ‘colour coding’ [57,58], ‘orientation detecting’ [59],
‘motion coding’, most have in fact extremely complex response
properties, responding to a wide variety of stimuli, depending
on eye region, spectral content and behavioural context, and
may at best be described as responding predominantly to a
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Figure 4. Bees cannot perceive complex visual stimuli ‘at a glance’. Bees
were trained in a flight arena with six feeding platforms (blue horizontal
lines in the panels on the bottom) positioned in front of a 120 Hz
(8.33 ms refresh rate) gaming monitor. Separate groups of bees were trained
on five tasks, ranging from simple detection to complex pattern discrimi-
nation, in four temporal presentation conditions, ranging from continuous
presentation (static) to timed presentation (repetition rate randomized
between 500 and 1000 ms) for 100, 50 or 25 ms. (a) Detection of oriented
bar; (b) discrimination of 458 from 2458 bars; (c) coarse colour discrimi-
nation yellow-blue; (d ) fine colour discrimination yellow-orange; (e)
discrimination of spider shape from circle (only two of six stimuli shown
for simplicity). All of the bees were successful in acquiring the simple detec-
tion task, regardless of presentation duration. For fine colour discrimination,
stimulus durations of at least 50–100 ms were required (d ), while only a
single bee learned the shape discrimination at 100 ms, even though all
bees learned the task under continuous presentation (e). Modified from
Nityananda et al. [47], with permission.
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network with as few as eight of the simplest feature detector
neurons was able to discriminate a large variety of seemingly
complex visual patterns that had previously been used in
honeybee learning experiments [60]. In reality a subset of
some 200 000 Kenyon cells of the mushroom bodies will be
sampling the output of perhaps 200 classes of optic lobe
neuron [61]. So long as any stimulus property (e.g. number)
is represented by a recognizable ensemble code at the interface
between these projection neurons and the mushroom body
intrinsic Kenyon cells, that stimulus property is codable and
memorizable. In this sense, number might simply be an emer-
gent property of an ensemble of neurons with even a modest
diversity of response properties.
6. Subitizing—counting at a glance?
Subitizing is the ability to recognize the number of items in a
visual scenewithout the need for sequential counting. This abil-
ity is limited to around four items. Unlike the approximate
(analogue magnitude) number system for assessing large
numerosities, where discrimination accuracy depends on the
ratio of two-numerical magnitudes [22], subitizing is thought
to be exact, and is thus not expected to show a ratio-
dependence. In addition, it involves rapid, parallel assessment
of object items. Field observations and spontaneous choice
experiments have often suggested an upper limit of around
four items in a variety of species, whilewith laboratory training
larger numbers can be discriminated, suggesting an analogue
magnitude system. This in itself, of course, does not prove
that distinct number systems are used in the two types of
tasks [62]). For example, although untrained cuttlefish can dis-
criminate one prey item from two and, in steps of one, up to
four from five, the decision time increases monotonically as
the ratio difference decreases, which is not what would be
expected if a subitizing mechanismwas responsible for the dis-
crimination of small numerosities [5]. Such increases in
response time with number of items to be processed indicate
serial, rather than parallel, evaluation of the visual scene [63,64].
In insects, at least, limits on the parallel processing of the
visual scene may be expected on the basis of fundamental
constraints imposed by compound eye design. The eye of a
bumblebee, for example, consists of 3000–4000 ommatidia
[65] and visual acuity is limited to around one degree of
visual angle [66], which seems to compare very poorly with
the 2 million cones and 0.5 arc min resolution of the primate
visual system. However, in terms of temporal resolving
power, the primate cone is outperformed by the photo-
receptors of many species of fast-flying insects. The fastest
known physiological response of any ocular photoreceptor
was recorded from the blowfly: at 348C the impulse response
begins at around 3 ms, peaks at 6 and is complete by 10 ms
[67]. This is reflected in flicker fusion frequencies, which
reach a maximum of 70–80 Hz under optimal conditions
with human observers, but are around 200 Hz in bees [68]
and possibly even higher in some flies.
Bumblebee photoreceptor processing speed also easily
outperforms that of primates [69]. But high-performance
photoreceptors do not come cheap: the short membrane time
constants required for temporal precision are attained by
substantial increases in membrane conductance. This incurs
a substantial metabolic cost, largely due to the energy expendi-
ture required to maintain concentration gradients in the face oflarge conductance increases; crepuscular or less rapidly
moving species forego this expenditure [70–72]. What justifies
this expenditure in the case of worker bees? A major effect of
increased temporal resolution is to reduce motion blur. If a
serial strategy, possibly depending on active vision, is used
by bees, then fast photoreceptors would increase the infor-
mation extracted from fast, brief scanning movements. It also
implies that bees would be unable to extract complex visual
information from a static sensory snapshot. In support of this
hypothesis, it was recently shown that bees fail all but the sim-
plest visual discrimination tasks when stimulus presentation
duration is limited ([47]; figure 4). This is similar to the situation
in tethered bees, which can learn visual discriminations of
simple, large colour or stimuli [73,74], but have not yet been
shown capable of complex visual discrimination, which is
just what wewould expect if active visual scanning is required
in the latter case
The subitizing mechanism is often taken to be ‘seeing at a
glance’ and indeed, in experiments on humans and non-
human primates visual presentations are often very brief to
ensure this. However, parallel as opposed to sequential presen-
tation of visual stimuli does not necessarily lead to parallel as
opposed to sequential processing by the nervous system. In
the experiments on number-based visual generalization in
honeybees [23] timing data for the bees’ choices are not pro-
vided, although the authors do note that in transfer tests the
bees appeared to spend additional time scanning the stimuli
where the target and distractor numerical quantities were pre-
sented via elements with novel perceptual qualities. In fact this
scanning behaviour itself, we suggest, may hold the key to
tim
e 
(s)
0
10
Figure 5. Flight path of a bee trained, with differential conditioning, to
select stimuli with two items and avoid those with four. The first 10s of
the bee’s scanning behaviour are shown; the path is colour-coded to show
the progression from early (violet) to late (red). The bee sequentially exam-
ines two patterns containing four items, but rejects each of them after
scanning three items in each. She then chooses a pattern containing the cor-
rect number of two purple crosses (even though she has not been rewarded
on any other dots than yellow ones before) and finally selects another pattern
with the correct number of two (yellow) dots. Dots are separated by time
intervals of 33 ms. See also electronic supplementary material, video S1.
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nations they do. One possibility is that coding via motor
sequences [75] may be involved. Additionally, bees could
exploit the high temporal resolution of their vision in order
to extract additional spatial information in an active vision
strategy, if the motor commands of scanning movements
could be correlated with precisely timed visual information.
The latter proposalwould bemore difficult, but not impossible,
to test; either way we suggest that focusing on the temporal
dynamics of bees’ visuomotor search behaviour will help
reveal the underlying basis of their numerical discrimination.
In one preliminary experiment, using differential condition-
ing, a bumblebee was rewarded on various patterns containing
two elements, and trained to avoid patterns that contained four
(figure 5; electronic supplementarymaterial, video S1). Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the bee learnt the task independently of the
colour or shape of the elements, or the area subtended by
them. The flight path of the bee holds interesting clues to the
decision-making and counting process. The bee inspected and
scanned both ‘twos’ and ‘fours’, indicating that it could not
make a decision from a distance. The flight path shows
the bee inspecting items within a pattern one by one, similar
to the kind of ‘motor tagging’ observed in some primates [76].
The bee avoids scanning the same stimulus element multiple
times, indicating working memory control of the scanning
behaviour. However, after scanning, the bee not only landed
more frequently on ‘two’ than ‘four’, but also rejected more
‘fours’ after inspection, showing that an evaluation of all
types of decisions (correct acceptance of training stimulus,
correct rejection of unrewarded stimulus and the correspond-
ing two types of errors) is tantamount [77–79]. In addition,
the sequential nature of the inspection of the elements in a
pattern yields certain predictions that can be tested further.
For example, how does a bee trained to ‘two’ avoid accepting
a ‘four’—even though the ‘four’ contains the required two
elements? Must the bee then ascertain that a given patterncontains ‘more than two’ to reject it with certainty (for
example, it appears in electronic supplementary material,
video S1 that the bee rejects a ‘four’ after having inspected
three items in the pattern)? What kind of flight manoeuvers
andworkingmemorystrategies ensure that bees avoid counting
an element twice?
7. Conclusion
Although traditionally regarded as a higher cognitive function,
the ability to enumerate small sets of items is widespread in
‘lower vertebrates’ as well as mammals. Not even the basic
architectural plan of the vertebrate brain seems to be required.
Bees and most probably some other insects show a basic
numerical competence, which may be limited to around four
items. This is similar to the limit of the small number system
of human adults and infants [31], non-human primates [78]
and many other vertebrate species ([80]; see also Agrillo &
Bisazza [4]). No evidence has yet been found for the existence
of a separate number system for approximate processing of
large numerosities in insects.
Basic numerical cognition, then, seems not to require (e.g.)
a dedicated cortical module, but may instead be an inherent
aspect of the process of organizing sensory input into objects
of perception and maintaining object representations in work-
ing memory as required [31,40]. In support of this, theoretical
and simulation studies show that relatively simple network
models can mimic many experimental results on numerosity
discrimination [6,53]. Basic numerical cognition does not
seem to require a large brain [49]. Indeed, while small com-
pared to vertebrate brains, insect brains appear to offer more
than enough complexity. How the complex processing in the
insect optic lobe is integrated with structures of the central
brain to permit number-based visual discrimination remains
largely unknown, but the diverse array of neuronal types
and central projections (e.g. [61]) would seem to conceal
more than enough complexity to implement simple classifier
[60,81] and enumeration algorithms.
Although the small number system is often associated
with parallel processing and perceiving the number of
items in a small set ‘at a glance’ (subitizing), the brief stimu-
lus exposures necessary to confirm this have only been used
in primate experiments. Although parallel processing in
working memory may be required, this does not necessarily
mean that parallel processing at the visual input stage is also
required. It may be informative to control presentation dur-
ations in experiments with lower vertebrates where stimuli
are presented in parallel in numerosity discrimination tasks.
Certainly, bees are unable to process visual scenes (other
than the most basic visual attributes) when stimulus presen-
tation duration is restricted [47]. Numerosity and other visual
discriminations in bees instead seem to depend on serial
processing [64], involving active scanning supported by a
fast visual system [69]. The upper limit of small number
perception more probably reflects the capacity limit of work-
ing memory, which may be similar across species in terms of
number of representation that can be maintained, although
large-brained species such as humans can represent more fea-
tures of a given object [82]. Detailed analysis of the
visuomotor behaviour underlying bees’ choices in discrimi-
nation experiments is likely to elucidate the strategies (and
also limitations) by which they make the perceptual choices
they do.
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